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Case Notes
Murguia v. Municipal Court-The Defense
of Discriminatory Prosecution
Murguia v. Municipal Court' begins to clarify California law on
the subject of discriminatory prosecution and stands as the first
decision of a supreme court, state or federal, to expressly hold that
the defense of discriminatory prosecution is available to a criminal
defendant. However, a close inspection of the practical and proce-
dural aspects of implementing the defense reveals a number of se-
rious problems and unanswered questions that, if not recognized
and acted upon, may ultimately relegate this defense to the status
of an idle curiosity of merely academic interest.
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins2 the United States Supreme Court signif-
icantly swelled the protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by holding8 that the equal protection clause proscribes not
merely the enactment of laws that are patently discriminatory, but
also the unequal application of civil laws that appear to be fair:
[Although a] law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appear-
ance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circum-
stances material to their rights . . .4
1. 15 Cal. 3d 286, 540 P.2d 44, 124 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1975).
2. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
3. Id. at 374.
4. Id. at 373-74.
there is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Subsequent cases,5 supported by a host of authorities,6 have
struggled with the many considerations involved in extending the
Yick Wo rationale to discriminatory enforcement of criminal laws.
Except for a handful of disparate decisions scattered throughout
a few jurisdictions, such attempts have been largely unsuccessful.
The United States Supreme Court has been confronted with the
issue of discriminatory enforcement on two major occasions7 but
at no time have the facts allowed the Court to consider the issue
directly. The policy of "restrained review" has consequently pro-
duced only oblique discussions of the problems.
In Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley,8 an ac-
tion to enjoin the enforcement of a Pennsylvania Sunday closing
law on the grounds that the statute unconstitutionally infringed
upon First Amendment religious freedoms and that it was being
discriminatorily enforced against plaintiff's department store in vio-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court upheld the lower
court's denial of injunctive relief against the discriminatory prose-
cution claim, stating that the pending prosecutions did not warrant
such relief:
Since appellant's employees may defend against any such proceed-
ing that is actually prosecuted on the ground of unconstitutional
discrimination, we do not believe the court below was incorrect in
refusing to exercise its injunctive powers...9
The California court in Murguia'° quite liberally characterizes this
as part of the ratio decidendi and, therefore, an explicit holding
of the case. The Two Guys Court, however, recognized this as only
an "ancillary matter"" and actually held, in ruling on the constitu-
tionality of the Sunday closing statute, "that neither the statute's
5. A comprehensive, California-oriented survey of the problem as it re-
lates to preconviction procedures for raising the defense of discriminatory
enforcement may be found in Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 404 (1965). See also 21
AM. Jun. 2d, Criminal Law § 231 (1965) and 17 CAL. JuR. 3d, Criminal Law
§ 109 (1975).
6. The most notable of these are Comment, The Right to Nondiscrim-
inatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws,. 1961 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 and
Note, Discriminatory Law Enforcement and Equal Protection From The
Law, 1949-50 YALE L.J. 354.
7. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).; Two Guys from Harrison-Allen-
town, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
8. 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
9. Id. at 588-89.
10. Murguia v. Municipal Court, 15 Cal. 3d 286, 299, 540 P.2d 44, 52, 124
Cal. Rptr. 204, 212 (1975).
11. Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
at 588 (1961).
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purpose nor its effect is religious"'12 and that "the state does [not]
have other means at its disposal to accomplish its secular purpose
that would not. . . give state aid to religion.' 1
Oyler v. Boles' 4 was a habeas corpus proceeding in which the de-
fendant contended that the West Virginia habitual criminal statute
had been discriminatorily enforced against him, alleging that the
statute had not been enforced against others similarly situated. The
Supreme Court rejected these arguments stating that
IT]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not
in itself a federal constitutional violation. Even though the statis-
tics in this case might imply a policy of selective enforcement, it
was not stated that the selection was deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary clas-
sification. Therefore grounds supporting a finding of a denial of
equal protection were not alleged.15
The California court in Murguia'6 again quite emphatically con-
cludes that this decision establishes the availability of the defense
of discriminatory prosecution. But even if these statements are ac-
curate, the decisions have left a number of significant procedural
questions, inherent in establishing the defense of discriminatory
prosecution, unanswered.
The Court of Appeals of New York 7 was the only state supreme
court to favorably consider the issue prior to Murguia. In a memo-
randum decision, the court stated that "we do not hold that defend-
ant has demonstrated intentional discrimination in her prosecution.
We rule, merely, that she should have a fair opportunity to establish
it on her trial."' 8
California decisions prior to Murguia provided little encourage-
ment. A few cases' 9 suggest that the defense of discriminatory en-
12. Id. at 598.
13. Id.
14. 368 U.S. 448 (19062).
15. Id. at 456.
16. 15 Cal. 3d 286, 300, 540 P.2d 44, 53, 124 Cal. Rptr. 204, 213 (1975).
17. People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E.2d 779, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96
(1964).
18. Id. at 902, 200 N.E.2d at 779-80, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
19. People v. Flanders, 140 Cal. App. 2d 765, 296 P.2d 13 (1956); People
v. Sipper, 61 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 844, 142 P.2d 960 (1943); People v. Darcy,
59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P.2d 118 (1943); People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal.
App. 2d 1, 117 P.2d 437 (1941).
forcement may not be raised at any stage of a criminal proceeding.
Others20 would allow the defense if the prosecution is for a malum
prohibitum offense but not for one malum in se. Even when recog-
nizing it, the courts have stated that the trial court cannot take
judicial notice or otherwise raise the defense on its own motion.2'
In one case,22 the court concluded that the use of a pretrial motion
for dismissal of the indictment was not the appropriate procedure
for raising the issue, and that the defense could only be asserted
at trial. Other cases23 suggest the opposite result. Two California
caseS2 4 have even intimated that injunctive relief would be the
proper remedy. It was against this setting that Murguia was de-
cided.
MURGUIA25
Jose Guadalupe Murguia and five other members of the United
Farm Workers Union (hereinafter UFW) were variously charged
with misdemeanor offenses2 6 in the Municipal Court for the Bakers-
field Judicial District of Kern County, California, emanating from
picketing and organizational activities of the UFW in Kern County
in the summer of 1973.
Prior to trial, defendants filed motions seeking the dismissal of
the charges on the ground that the prosecutions violated their
State27 and Federal28 constitutional rights to the equal protection of
the laws, alleging that the charges against them were part of a de-
liberate systematic pattern of discriminatory enforcement of the
20. People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1960);
People v. Winters, 171 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 876, 342 P.2d 538 (1959).
21. People v. Winters, 171 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 876, 342 P.2d 538 (1959).
22. People v. Van Randall, 140 Cal. App. 2d 771, 296 P.2d 68 (1956).
See also cases cited note 20 supra.23. Although no reported California cases have held this, reported cases
in other jurisdictions have so held and a number of California trial court
decisions have been overturned for considering the "defense" on a motion
to dismiss.
24. Downing v. California State Board of Pharmacy, 85 Cal. App. 2d 30,
192 P.2d 39 (1948); Wade v. San Francisco, 82 Cal. App. 2d 337, 186 P.2d
181 (1947).
25. The facts reported in this note are taken from the California Su-
preme Court's account in Murguia.
26. The sections allegedly violated were CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 166(4), 594(West 1970); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 12951(a), 21750, 23103 (West 1971). The
charges were, respectively, willful disobedience of a court order, malicious
mischief, driving without a driver's license in possession, failing to pass an-
other vehicle to the left at a safe distance without interfering with the safe
operation of the overtaken vehicle, and reckless driving.
27. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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State's penal laws against UFW members and supporters, executed
by the Kern County District Attorney and Sheriff and by County
law enforcement officers generally.
In conjunction with their motion to dismiss, defendants filed a
motion to discover documentary and testimonial evidence from law
enforcement officials which, according to the defendants, related
to their discriminatory prosecution claim. In support of this second
motion, defendants submitted over 100 affidavits detailing numer-
ous incidents of alleged discriminatory conduct toward UFW mem-
bers and supporters during the summer of 1973. This conduct al-
legedly included the use of excessive force and brutality by Sher-
iff's deputies against nonviolent UFW members and violent assaults
against picketing UFW members by various persons which were
"ratified" and "encouraged" by the inaction of Sheriff's deputies
in whose presence these assaults were committed. Defendants also
filed affidavits alleging the participation of higher law enforcement
officers (including the district attorney) in the discriminatory en-
forcement scheme. The affidavits were submitted not as proof of
the fact of discriminatory enforcement, but rather as evidentiary
support for defendants' discovery motion. The People contended
that discriminatory enforcement could never constitute a basis for
dismissing a criminal action and therefore filed no counter affi-
davits or declarations.
The trial court explicitly found that the declarations established
a prima facie case of discriminatory enforcement of the laws,29 yet
it denied the discovery motion, apparently on the ground that Cali-
fornia law had not clearly sanctioned the defense. The Court of
Appeal, Fifth District, denied petitioners' writ of mandate seeking
to compel the municipal court to grant the discovery motion.3 0 The
defendants then petitioned for a writ of mandate from the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.
1. The Equal Protection Holding
The California Supreme Court, en banc, in an opinion by Justice
Tobriner, reviewed the random developments in this area of the
29. Murguia v. Municipal Court, 15 Cal. 3d 286, 293 n.3, 540 P.2d 44, 48
n.3, 124 Cal. Rptr. 204, 208 n.3 (1975).
30. Murguia v. Municipal Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 888, 898 (1974).
law and held first that a showing by a defendant that he would
not have been criminally prosecuted except for invidious discrimi-
nation against him establishes a violation of state and federal equal
protection requirements.3"
In developing this constitutional concept, the court made three
additional determinations. They first emphasized that either an in-
dividual or a member of a particular class may complain of alleged
equal protection violations. 32 The court then stated that the dis-
criminatory motive need not be the sole motive as long as it is the
primary one,33 and in a mixture of fact finding and holding, the
court concluded that a conscious policy of selective enforcement di-
rected against members or supporters of a particular labor organiza-
tion is prima facie discriminatory and invalid under the equal pro-
tection clause.3 4
2. The "Defense" Holding
The court then extended full recognition of the applicability of
the Yick Wo rationale to criminal prosecutions by holding that the
violation of equal protection requirements in the institution of crim-
inal proceedings constitutes a defense to the charges arising there-
from.3 5  This holding was also enlarged upon in three additional
discussions.
31. Murguia v. Municipal Court, 15 Cal. 3d 286, 290, 540 P.2d 44, 46, 124
Cal. Rptr. 204, 206 (1975).
32. Id. at 294, 540 P.2d at 49, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 209. An excellent discus-
sion of this issue may be found in Russo, Equal Protection from The Law:
The Substantive Requirements For A Showing Of Discriminatory Law En-forcement, 3 Loy. U.L. REV. (L.A.) 65, 75-82 (1970) in which the author
criticizes the apparent emphasis in Oyler v. Boles upon the requirement of
a definable class before the protections of the equal protection clause may
be invoked.
33. 15 Cal. 3d at 298 n.6, 540 P.2d at 52 n.6, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 212 n.6
(1975).
34. Id. at 301, 540 P.2d at 54, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
35. Id. at 300-01, 540 P.2d at 53-54, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14. The
Murguia court does not set forth one of the policy aspects of the defense
as clearly as does Klein, J., in People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 266,
63 Cal. Rptr. 211, 217 (1967) in which he states:
Although no case which we have read says so in so many words,
the recognition of discriminatory enforcement of a penal law as adefense to a criminal action is one of the few means the individual
citizen has to force public officials to do their job properly. Per-haps one of the unarticulated reasons why discriminatory enforce-
ment is recognized as a defense to a criminal prosecution is pretty
much the same as the basis for the rule excluding illegally obtained
evidence. We refuse to admit such evidence because we know of
no other way to force law enforcement agencies to obey the law.(citations omitted).The court in People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 17, 225
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The court first concluded that neither the "serious" nature of the
charges nor the multiplicity of penal statutes in question invalidates
a discriminatory prosecution defense.3 6 Aware of the existing con-
fusion in California surrounding the procedural aspects of raising
the defense,37 the court next determined that the issue of discrim-
inatory enforcement is for resolution by the court and should not
be tried to the jury as a "defense" to the substantive offense:88
The question of discriminatory prosecution relates not to the guilt
or innocence of [the accused], but rather addresses itself to a con-
N.Y.S.2d 128, 133 (Sup. Ct. 1962) offered a somewhat more dramatic state-
ment of policy:
The wrong sought to be prevented is a wrong by the public authori-
ties. To allow such arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of
a generally disregarded law is to place in the hands of the police
and the prosecutor a power of the type frequently invoked in coun-
tries ruled by a dictator but wholly out of harmony with the prin-
ciple of equal justice under law prevailing in democratic societies.
The court is asked to stop the prosecution not because the defend-
ant is innocent but because the public authorities are guilty of a
wrong in engaging in a course of conduct designed to discriminate
unconstitutionally against the defendant.
The policy also might serve to reduce the instances in which the trial
court might otherwise abuse its discretion. The appellate court in Murguia
v. Municipal Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 888, 895 (1974), after finding the first
two prerequisites for the maintenance of a discriminatory prosecution de-
fense (intentional discrimination, based "solely" on race, color, or other
arbitrary classification), then attempted to balance the harm to the indi-
vidual against society's interest in enforcing the criminal code. Not surpris-
ingly, the court found that the crimes with which defendants were charged
were serious enough to tip the balance against them. The Murguia court,
however, rather than using policy considerations to "balance" on an ad hoc
basis, appears to have obviated the need for this third step by doing the
weighing initially and determining, as a matter of law, that no compelling
state interest can justify the discriminatory enforcement of state penal laws.
But see note 63 infra.
It should also be noted that in making this holding the Murguia court
expressly disapproved California cases to the contrary. See 15 Cal. 3d at
301 n.l, 540 P.2d at 54 n.11, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 214 n.11.
36. 15 Cal. 3d at 303-05, 540 P.2d at 55-57, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 215-17.
37. Cases cited notes 19-24 supra.
38. 15 Cal. 3d at 293 n.4, 540 P.2d at 48 n.4, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 208 n.4.
The consequences of this decision are discussed infra.
Although beyond the scope of this note, methods other than preconviction
procedures are available to raise the defense, including a motion for a new
trial after a verdict of conviction has been rendered, a postconviction mo-
tion for an order in arrest of judgment, appellate review of a conviction,
and postconviction habeas corpus proceedings.
It should also be noted that the approach adopted here is similar to that
taken in FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) on a motion to suppress illegally seized
evidence. See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
stitutional defect in the institution of the prosecution.8 9 . . . [As
such, the claim] should not . . . be tried before the jury . . . but
should be treated as an application to the court for a dismissal or
quashing of the prosecution upon constitutional grounds. 40
To further define the procedural process, it was finally held that
a pretrial motion to dismiss is the proper procedure for resolution
of the issue of discriminatory enforcement:
[B]ecause a claim of discriminatory prosecution generally rests
upon evidence completely extraneous to the specific facts of the
charged offense, we believe the issue should not be resolved upon
evidence submitted at trial, but instead should be raised ...
through a pretrial motion to dismiss. 41
3. The Discovery Holding
Recognizing that in a California criminal prosecution the accused
is generally entitled to discover all relevant and material informa-
tion in the possession of the prosecution that will assist him in his
defense 42 and having already held that the defense of discrimina-
tory prosecution is potentially available to all criminal defendants,
the court finally held that a total denial of discovery is erroneous
where a defendant can in fact show preliminarily that he would
not have been prosecuted except for an invidious discrimination
against him. 45 As even the appellate court had found that the de-
fendants had made the requisite showing of discriminatory enforce-
ment,44 the Supreme Court issued a writ of mandate directing the
39. 15 Cal. 3d at 293 n.4, 540 P.2d at 48 n.4, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 208 n.4.
See U.S. v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1973).
40. 15 Cal. 3d at 293 n.4, 540 P.2d at 48-49 n.4, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 208-
09 n.4. See People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12 at 15, 225
N.Y.S.2d 128 at 131 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
41. 15 Cal. 3d at 293-94 n.4, 540 P.2d at 49 n.4, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 209
n.4 disapproving People v. Van Randall, 140 Cal. App. 2d 771, 296 P.2d 68
(1950) insofar as language in the latter case in inconsistent with the holding
in Murguia.
The Murguia court, 15 Cal. 3d at 294 n.4, 540 P.2d at 49 n.4, 124 Cal. Rptr.
at 209 n.4, expresses some concern over the trial court's authority to enter-
tain a pretrial motion to dismiss in the absence of clear California statutory
authority to do so, but concludes that the constitutional nature of the issue
remedies the defect. See People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d
12 at 17, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 at 133 (Sup. Ct. 1962); but see People v. Walker,
14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E.2d 779, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1964).
The proposed State of California JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE FOR REVI-
SION OF THE PENAL CODE, CAL. CRIM. P. CODE §§ 10001, 10151, 10155 and
10301 (1975), though not expressly authorizing a pretrial dismissal on dis-
criminatory enforcement grounds, nonetheless appears broad enough to en-
compass the Murguia situation.
42. Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 817, 518 P.2d 1353, 1356, 112
Cal. Rptr. 257, 260 (1974).
43. 15 Cal. 3d at 305, 540 P.2d at 57, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
44. Murguia v. Municipal Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1974) and discussion
supra note 35.
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trial court to vacate its order denying discovery and remanded the
case.
45
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MURGUIA
As promising as the Supreme Court's recognition of the defense
of discriminatory enforcement may appear to be to California crim-
inal defendants, the practical and procedural aspects of establishing
the defense pose serious problems. 46 Even if the defense is effec-
tively maintained, there are additional hazards awaiting the crim-
inal defendant and few viable independent remedies at his disposal.
1. The Difficulty of Establishing the Defense
Initially, for purposes of obtaining a discovery order (and later
upon the proof of the matter), the criminal defendant must "qual-
ify" for the defense by showing that he falls within that class of
defendants, as defined by the Murguia court, to whom the defense
is available. He must show that individually, or as a member of
an identifiable class, he was singled out for prosecution on the basis
of some invidious criterion.47 Moreover, a showing that a discrimi-
natory motive was a factor in the prosecution is insufficient; the
discriminatory animus must have been the primary motive in bring-
ing the prosecution.48 Finally, the defendant must plead his case
45. 15 Cal. 3d at 306, 540 P.2d at 57, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
46. The vast majority of reported cases have not sustained the defense
even in those jurisdictions in which it is accorded some recognition. The
Murguia decision may ironically have added to that imbalance. See discus-
sion infra.
47. The Murguia court, almost without discussion, impliedly categorizes
the defendants as members of a definable class (UFW members) rather
than as individuals pressing separate discriminatory prosecution claims and
then summarily finds the classification invidious (i.e. "unjustifiable"). 15
Cal. 3d at 290, 300, 540 P.2d at 46, 53, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 206, 213. Whether
this is intentional or an inadvertent consequence of consolidating the six
separate misdemeanor actions for trial cannot be determined. If the former,
the summary finding of invidiousness is clearly a development of some sig-
nificance in the context of California constitutional law. See 5 WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 347-408 (1974).
48. Although the Murguia court does hold that the primary motive must
be discriminatory, 15 Cal. 3d at 294, 298 n.6, 540 P.2d at 49, 52 n.6, 124 Cal.
Rptr. at 209, 212 n.6, other language in the opinion, if read out of context,
might seem to suggest otherwise: "[T]he issue here is whether the prose-
tion is constitutionally free to select only these defendants and prosecute
them only because they are members of a certain class, i.e. members or
carefully to avoid the problems a number of defendants have en-
countered before reluctant courts.49
The criminal defendant will next encounter problems in the dis-
covery process itself.5 0 The Murguia court only hinted at the diffi-
culties involved:
Because the trial court ruled that no discovery with respect to the
discriminatory enforcement issue was proper, it did not pass upon
the discoverability of the specific items requested, nor the propri-
ety, or permissible scope, of any oral examination of specific law
enforcement officers. On remand, the People will be free to raise
any objections to the specific information sought, including a claim
for privileges for "official information" 5 1 .. the trial court
should, of course, resolve all such objections before compelling dis-
covery.
52
Although the state generally has no interest in denying the accused
access to all evidence in their possession that can illuminate the
issues in the case,58 and even though several cases have authorized
the discovery of specified documents in the possession of the prose-
cution,54 a sufficient showing of need is required 5 and no California
supporters of a particular union." 15 Cal. 3d at 290-91, 540 P.2d at 46, 124
Cal. Rptr. at 206.
49. In Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962), for example, the Court denied
relief directly on the ground that the defendant had failed to allege that
the discrimination was based upon an unjustifiable standard. 368 U.S. at
456.
50. California criminal discovery rules are scattered throughout the
codes and case law. Excellent general sources are WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 271-74, 783-85 (1963) and WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SUPPLEMENT §§ 271-74, 783-85 (1973); WITKIN, CALI-
FORNIA EVIDENCE §§ 1055-62, 878A, 881 (1966) and WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVI-
DENCE 2D §§ 1055-62, 878A, 881 (Supp. 1974); CAL. EV. CODE §§ 1040, 1042(a),
915(b) (West 1966); Comment, Governmental Privileges: Roadblock To
Effective Discovery, 7 U. SAN FR. L.R. 282 (1973).
51. 15 Cal. 3d at 305-06 n.18, 540 P.2d at 57 n.18, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 217
n.18. An argument could be made that CAL. Ev. CODE § 1040 (West 1966)
is inapplicable where discovery is sought pursuant to a discriminatory pros-
ecution claim. The annotation to the section states that official information
is absolutely privileged if its disclosure is forbidden by state statute. As
no state statute exists absolutely prohibiting such disclosure, the privilege
is only conditional and is susceptible to being defeated if sufficiently per-
suasive policy arguments are advanced. See Comment, Governmental Priv-
ileges: Roadblock To Effective Discovery, 7 U. SAN. FR. L.R. 282, 300
(1973).
52. 15 Cal. 3d at 305-06 n.18, 540 P.2d at 57 n.18, 124 -Cal. Rptr. at 217
n.18.
53. People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 585-86, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956).
54. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 536-37, 522 P.2d 305, 308-
09, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900-01 (1974); Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d
704, 707, 312 P.2d 698, 700 (1957). The former case is also superb in its
discussion of the claim of governmental (official) privilege. It is significant
that in Pitchess the defendant was able to discover materials (through a
subpoena duces tecum) in the sheriff's investigative records for the purpose
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case has yet granted a motion to fully discover all documentary
and testimonial evidence relating to a claim of discriminatory en-
forcement.56 Even if the discovery order is granted, there is no
assurance that the prosecution will comply with it,57 and if he does
not comply, whether his failure to do so will be to the defendant's
advantage."8
Assuming that these obstacles have been met, the defendant must
then convince the court by a preponderance of the evidence5 9 that
he has in fact been invidiously discriminated against in the initia-
tion of the prosecution. 60 Only certain showings are sufficient, 61
of determining whether the complaining witnesses (deputies) had a past
propensity for violence (battery prosecution). See also Hill v. Superior
Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 518 P.2d 1353, 112 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974) and WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE SUPPLEMENT § 1055A (1974).
55. A "blanket" request is insufficient. WIT=K, supra note 54 at § 1061
explores this area thoroughly.
56. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 522 P.2d 305, 113 Cal. Rptr.
897 (1974), discussed supra note 54, has perhaps made the greatest advances
toward reaching this pinnacle, although that case was a battery prosecution
and lacked the discriminatory enforcement element.
57. As a practical matter it would seem a relatively easy task for one
so inclined to deny having possession of any of the documents requested,
especially if the request was not for specific, previously identified docu-
ments, but only for classes of materials in the possession of the public offi-
cers. Establishing contempt or fraud would then be an extremely difficult
task for the discovering party.
58. Establishing a willful failure to comply on the part of the prosecutor
might produce one of two consequences. First, any proffered prosecution
testimony relevant to the requested materials could be stricken on motion
of the defendant. Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 819, 330 P.2d
39, 43 (1958). The criminal action could also be dismissed in a proper case.
People v. Garcia, 67 Cal. 2d 830, 842, 434 P.2d 366, 374, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110,
118 (1967). Dismissal might not preclude refiling, however. See note 69
infra. An excellent discussion may be found in Margolin, Toward Effective
Criminal Discovery In California-A Practitioner's View, 56 CAL. L.R. 1040,
1054 (1968).
59. 'The burden of persuasion is upon the party defending a criminal
prosecution on the ground of discriminatory prosecution. CAL. Ev. CODE §§
115, 605, 606, 664 (West 1966); People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 265,
63 Cal. Rptr. 211, 216-17 (1967). The quantum of proof required is a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. People v. Gray, supra at 265-66 n.12, 63 Cal.
Rptr. at 217-18 n.12.
60. An interesting distinction is made in Note, 78 HARv. L. REV. 884, 885
(1965). In discussing People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E.2d 779, 252
N.Y.S.2d 96 (1964), the author states:
Although the [U.S. Supreme] Court has consistently held that un-
equal application of a law is not a denial of equal protection unless
intentional or purposeful discrimination is proved, it has not yet
[VOL. 3: 351, 1976] Murguia v. Municipal Court
and an evidentiary presumption operates against the proponent of
the evidence on this issue. 2 Even if discrimination is found, the
court could reject the defense on compelling grounds. 8
2. Other Problems Following Dismissal
Granted the resourcefulness of the defendant and his desire and
ability to establish the defense, other problems remain. Because
the issue is now to be tried to the court on a pretrial motion to
dismiss,64 the People have a right to appeal from the dismissal.65
This is undoubtedly true where the trial takes place in an inferior
court,6 6 but would not be true if the charge is a felony and the
dismissal is entered by a superior court.67 But because the felony
matter must now also be tried to the court, jeopardy has not at-
tached 8 and the People may consequently, upon a dismissal, reinsti-
considered the question presented in the instant case-whether in-
tentional or purposeful discrimination existing within a scheme of
general or random enforcement violates the equal protection clause.
In Walker the court granted Miss Walker a new trial at which, she would
be allowed to present evidence of discriminatory enforcement within a ran-
dom enforcement scheme. The Murguia court does not address the issue
but its pronouncements place it clearly within the Walker class of cases,
in which proof of discriminatory enforcement is much more difficult.
61. Mere laxity in the enforcement of the law is insufficient. In re Finn,
54 Cal. 2d 807, 812-13, 356 P.2d 685, 688, 8 Cal. Rptr. 741, 744 (1960). But
proof of prosecution under a law that has fallen into desuetude would con-
stitute some evidence of discriminatory enforcement. See Rodgers and
Rodgers, Desuetude As A Defense, 52 IowA L.R. 1, 9-13 (1966).
The fact that others equally guilty have not been prosecuted is insuffi-
cient. People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 14, 117 P.2d 437, 446
(1964); People v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 353-54, 139 P.2d 118, 126
(1943). Cf. People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225
N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
Intentional, invidious discrimination may be inferred from statistical evi-
dence. People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 269, 63 Cal. Rptr. 211, 219
(1967). See also People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 837, 5 Cal. Rptr.
852 (1960).
A general survey of the problem may be found in Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 404,
410-11 (1965).
62. CAL. Ev. CODE § 664 (West 1966). See discussion supra note 59.
63. The court in People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12,
20, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128, 136 (Sup. Ct. 1962) stated: "Selective enforcement
may be justified when the meaning or constitutionality of the law is in
doubt and a test case is needed to clarify the law or to establish its validity.
Selective enforcement may also be justified when a striking example or a
few examples are sought in order to deter other violators, as a part of a
bona fide rational pattern of general enforcement ... " Whether Murguia
has extinguished this possibility remains to be seen.
64. 15 Cal. 3d at 293-94 n.4, 540 P.2d at 48-49 n.4, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 208-
09 n.4.
65. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1466 (West 1970).
66. Id.
67. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1238 (West 1970).
68. Cf. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
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tute proceedings within the applicable statute of limitations pe-
riod.6 9 The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata as to
the issue of discriminatory enforcement would appear not to apply
to the second prosecution. 70
In the context of this potentially inadequate legal remedy (i.e.
dismissal), some form of injunctive relief would appear desirable.
The Murguia court, however, appears to have precluded this possi-
bility.71 The immunity of the investigative and prosecutorial au-
thorities in tort is solidly established, 72 even apart from the effect
the "pretrial" aspect of the Murguia holding will have upon the
situation.73 The only potential independent remedy for the victims
of discriminatory enforcement would appear to be under federal
civil rights statutes74 or by way of a direct cause of action based
upon the Fourteenth Amendment. 75 In most cases the public prose-
69. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1387 (West 1970). The adoption of the proposed
State of California JOINT LEGISLATrvE COMMITTEE FOR REviSION OF THE
PENAL CODE, CAL. CRIM. P. CODE § 10301(c) (1975), however, might have
the effect of authorizing the reinstitution of proceedings after the dismissal
of misdemeanor (as well as felony) prosecutions on discriminatory enforce-
ment grounds.
70. The distinction made supra note 60 would prevent a Walker or
Murguia-oriented court from entertaining a second prosecution if the doc-
trines were applicable. The prosecutor, having once lost, could not venture
out and arrest a few additional persons and succeed in removing the taint
of discriminatory prosecution in the second proceeding against the original
defendant.
71. 15 Cal. 3d at 293-94 n.4, 540 P.2d at 48-49 n.4, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 208-
09 n.4.
72. CAL. GovT. CODE § 821.6 (West 1966). But there may be criminal
liability. CAL. PEN. CODE § 170 (West 1970).
73. The most likely tort remedies, were it not for immunity problems,
would be abuse of process and malicious prosecution. The latter cannot
be established in any event. See cases collected 32 CAL. JuR. 2D, Malicious
Prosecution § 8 (1956). Cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976). In
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 857 (4th ed. 1971) the author discusses abuse of
process as follows: "[T]here is no liability where the defendant has done
nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even
though with bad intentions." The pretrial process would establish nothing
more than "bad intentions," and the possibility of refiling the charges (no
res judicata effect) establishes the lack of conclusion.
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970).
75. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narc., 403
U.S. 388, 395-96 (1971); Gabaldon v. United Farm Workers Organizing Com-
mittee, 35 Cal. App. 3d 757, 762-63 n.4, 111 Cal. Rptr. 203, 206 n.4 (1973).
Contra, Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976).
cutor would not even be subject to discipline by the California Bar
Association.7 6
CONCLUSION
The procedural requirements controlling the implementation of
the discriminatory prosecution defense make it highly unlikely that
the defense will ever be raised successfully in California. Minor
offenders will be reluctant to go to the trouble and considerable
expense of successfully establishing the defense, while major of-
fenders would theoretically never have the opportunity to raise the
issue, as police and prosecutorial discretion are generally at their
lowest when more serious crimes are involved.7 7 Subsequent cases
must grapple with the problems of construing the Murguia stand-
ards and adhering to its requirements; courts must remain alert
to the possibility that a rigid reliance upon existing statutory and
case authority might easily cause the defense of discriminatory en-
forcement to fall into desuetude. If it is really more desirable for
society to allow an admittedly guilty person to go free than to per-
mit a court to convict one whom the prosecutor has subjected to
discriminatory enforcement of the law in violation of constitutional
equal protection guarantees, as the Murguia court has maintained,
then some rethinking must be done before this objective can be
fully attained.78
JEFFREY L. GARLAND
76. The relevant provision (DR7-103) would be inapplicable as probable
cause would ordinarily be present and, because the matter is tried to the
court on a motion to dismiss, the question of the defendant's guilt would
not be raised.
77. Richardson, J., concurring in Murguia, 15 Cal. 3d at 306, 540 P.2d
at 58, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 218, appears to be overly concerned. Though the
Murguia requirements are applicable to major crimes, as a practical matter
such crimes are prosecuted in all instances, leaving little if any room for
prosecutorial discretion. See Comment, The Right To Nondiscriminatory
Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 1961 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1140-41, and
KADISH AND PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1124-26, 1178-91
(3d ed. 1975).
78. A Murguia discriminatory prosecution defense was recently rejected
in In re Elizabeth G, 53 Cal. App. 3d 725 (1975). The court affirmed a
trial court ruling that a female minor had solicited to engage in an act of
prostitution in violation of CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(b) (West 1970). The
defendant's claim that many more females than males had been arrested
for soliciting or engaging in prostitution was rejected when the evidence
failed to show that the police had embarked on a systematic program of
intentional and purposeful discriminatory enforcement-of the statute against
females. 53 Cal. App. 3d at 733.
